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CONTRA PROFERENTEM AND THE ROLE OF THE
JURY IN CONTRACT INTERPRETATION
Ethan J. Leib & Steve Thel

*

INTRODUCTION
In our age of consumer arbitration—in which many consumer form
contracts declare that contractual disputes must take place in arbitral fora—we
can lose sight of what the alternative civil process would really look like. In
honor of the occasion to celebrate the contracts scholarship of Bill Whitford, we
consider how a jury might be instructed in the interpretation of standard form
contracts in a civil judicial proceeding. Whitford’s work has independently
looked at “the role of the jury (and the fact/law distinction) in the interpretation
of written contracts”1 and standardized terms in consumer contracts.2 We
thought we would pursue the question of how a jury might be involved in the
interpretation of consumer form contracts, focusing especially on how the maxim
of contra proferetem figures into the story of interpretation. 3 Contra proferentem
usually requires that an interpreter read an ambiguous contract provision against
the drafter of that provision. Although contra proferentem would seem to have
especial application to the world of standard form contracting in the consumer
context—serving to help consumers as a general matter—little work exists
explaining and exploring how contra proferentem actually functions. Contra

* Ethan J. Leib is Professor of Law at Fordham Law School. Steve Thel is the Wormser Professor of
Law at Fordham Law School. Thanks to Fordham Law School for financial support, to Lea Yoon,
Sarah Jaramillo, and David Isakov for research support, and to Daniel Schwarcz, Ben Zipursky, David
Horton, Bill Whitford, Tom Lee, and Joe Perillo for some nice leads. We are grateful for the invitation
from the Temple Law Review to write this Essay in honor of Bill Whitford’s lifetime achievements.
1. William C. Whitford, The Role of the Jury (and the Fact/Law Distinction) in the Interpretation
of Written Contracts, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 931, 931 (capitalized in original).
2. See William C. Whitford, Contract Law and the Control of Standardised Terms in Consumer
Contracts: An American Report, 3 EU. REV. PRIVATE L. 193 (1995).
3.
For some recent work on contra proferentem, see Michelle E. Boardman, Contra
Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1105 (2006) [hereinafter
Boardman, Contra Proferentem]; Michelle Boardman, Penalty Default Rules in Insurance Law, 40
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 305 (2013) [hereinafter Boardman, Penalty Default Rules]; David Horton, Flipping
the Script: Contra Proferentem and Standard Form Contracts, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 431 (2009). For
older treatments, see John T. Flynn, The Rule Contra Proferentem in the Government Contract
Interpretation Process, 11 PUB. CONT. L.J. 379, 381 (1980); David S. Miller, Insurance as Contract: The
Argument for Abandoning the Ambiguity Doctrine, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1849, 1849–53 (1988); Michael
B. Rappaport, The Ambiguity Rule and Insurance Law: Why Insurance Contracts Should Not Be
Construed Against the Drafter, 30 GA. L. REV. 171, 254 (1995).
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proferentem is a “first principle of insurance law,”4 but its continuing relevance
in more general contract law is presumed rather than carefully examined.
Here are some questions we pursued: Are courts using contra proferentem
against drafting entities (when the cases aren’t arbitrated)? Are they limiting its
application to the standard form contracting context? Do courts use it to avoid
bringing juries into interpretation, since, conventionally, contra proferetem is
only triggered upon a legal finding of ambiguity?5 Yet, as a matter of black-letter
law, aren’t juries supposed to determine the meaning of contracts when terms
are ambiguous?6 Is contra proferentem then a rule for guiding the jury’s
interpretation, allowing it to decide what an ambiguous contract provision
means?7 Is it only to be used as a tiebreaker 8 or a rule of “last resort”? 9 Before
or after other extrinsic evidence is brought to bear to discern the meaning of an

4. Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory of Insurance Policy Interpretation, 95 MICH. L. REV. 531, 531
(1996); see also Phillips v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 302, 312 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he contra
proferentem rule[] is followed in all fifty states and the District of Columbia, and with good reason.
Insurance policies are almost always drafted by specialists employed by the insurer. In light of the
drafters’ expertise and experience, the insurer should be expected to set forth any limitations on its
liability clearly enough for a common layperson to understand; if it fails to do this, it should not be
allowed to take advantage of the very ambiguities that it could have prevented with greater diligence.”
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Kunin v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 534, 540 (9th Cir. 1990)));
KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 37 (5th ed. 2010). But see Ed E. Duncan,
The Demise of Contra Proferentem as the Primary Rule of Insurance Contract Interpretation in Ohio
and Elsewhere, 41 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 1121 (2006).
5. See FDIC v. Conn. Nat’l Bank, 916 F.2d 997, 1006 (5th Cir. 1990). For cases using it as a
matter of law for the court, see Kunin., 910 F.2d at 541; and Motor Coils Mfg. Co. v. Am. Ins. Co., 454
A.2d 1044, 1049–50 (Pa. Super. 1982) (applying the rule after giving the jury a chance to otherwise
interpret an ambiguous provision). See also infra Section III.
6. See, e.g., Hewett Grocery Co. v. Biddle Purchasing Co., 286 N.W. 221, 236 (Mich. 1939).
7. See, e.g., 1901 Wyoming Ave. Coop. Ass’n v. Lee, 345 A.2d 456, 463 (D.C. 1975) (suggesting
it is a rule for the jury to apply); Klapp v. United Ins. Grp. Agency, Inc., 663 N.W.2d 447, 454–55
(Mich. 2003) (same); Herweyer v. Clark Highway Servs., Inc., 564 N.W.2d 857 (Mich. 1997) (same);
Steven W. Feldman & James A. DeLanis, Resolving Contractual Ambiguity in Tennessee: A Systematic
Approach, 68 TENN. L. REV. 73, 91 (2000) (noting that most interpretive disputes will be resolved by
the time the court instructs the fact-finder on contra proferentem).
8. For one case treating it as a tiebreaker, see, e.g., Pacifico v. Pacifico, 920 A.2d 73, 79 (N.J.
2007).
9. See Residential Mktg. Grp. v. Granite Inv. Grp., 933 F.2d 546 (7th Cir. 1991); Schering Corp.
v. Home Ins. Co., 712 F.2d 4, 10 n.2 (2d Cir. 1983); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Pridgen, 498 So.
2d 1245, 1248 (Fla. 1986) (“[O]nly when a genuine inconsistency, uncertainty, or ambiguity in meaning
remains after resort to the ordinary rules of construction is the rule apposite.”). But see Chem.
Leaman Tank Lines Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 817 F. Supp. 1136, 1155 (D.N.J. 1993) (“Even
assuming that the evidence of the drafter’s intent conclusively shows the desired meaning of the word
‘sudden,’ the doctrine of contra proferentem—or ‘against the one who proffers’—precludes this court
from considering this evidence.”).
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ambiguous word?10 If it is truly only a “tiebreaker,” are juries given the
instruction only after they are otherwise deadlocked?11
Are some courts using it as a stronger policy tool rather than a mere
tiebreaker for factfinders, as seems to occur within insurance law?12 Can a
drafter draft around contra proferentem? Would the answer depend on a
jurisdiction’s view of the rule as legal policy rather than as a rule of last resort?
On the relative bargaining power of the parties? On whether the contract is a
form agreement? We hope to begin to answer these questions here, giving
scholars and courts more information about one of the canons of contract
interpretation that many have heard of but few actually understand as a matter
of law in action. Bill Whitford would want us to know a little better how it works
in action.13
In the main, we sought answers to our questions by looking at both cases
and state pattern jury instructions. Using jury instructions to tell us about the law
on the ground isn’t a flawless methodology—they give us no sense of how often
matters actually go to the jury and they aren’t really citable legal authority. Still,
we have good reasons to think that trial courts and trial lawyers turn to model
jury instructions during trials to assess the court/jury divisions of labor and to
formulate for juries how to structure their deliberations in cases about contract
interpretation. Accordingly, they are a good window into the law on the
ground.14 Below we report what we’ve learned.
Section I explores various policy rationales for the rule of contra
proferentem, since the mechanics of applying the rule ought to bear some
relation to its reason for existence. Section II investigates to which contracts the
rule applies, asking whether it is more than an insurance law rule and whether it
has special application to standard form contracts. Section III examines whether
contra proferentem is a rule for the court as a matter of law or whether it is a rule
for the jury or factfinder. Section IV refines what kind of rule it is: a “tiebreaker”
or something else—and how we might design the rule to accomplish its ends.
Finally, Section V asks whether it is a default rule or mandatory rule in the cases
to which it applies.

10. Klapp, 663 N.W.2d at 455 (suggesting that contra proferentem is applied only after all
extrinsic evidence is considered).
11. As we will discuss, this is the approach of California. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL.
ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS No. 320 (2015) [hereinafter CAL. JURY INSTRUCTIONS].
12. In insurance law, there is often a hair trigger, implicating the question of whether a court
really needs to establish ambiguity to apply the rule. See Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at
Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961, 972 (1970).
13. See generally STEWART MACAULAY, JEAN BRAUCHER, JOHN KIDWELL & WILLIAM
WHITFORD, CONTRACTS: LAW IN ACTION (3d ed. 2010).
14. For examples of scholars looking to model jury instructions to learn about the law on the
ground, see, e.g., David A. Hoffman & Alexander S. Radus, Instructing Juries on Noneconomic
Contract Damages, 81 FORD. L. REV. 1221 (2012); Patrick J. Kelley & Laurel A. Wendt, What Judges
Tell Juries About Negligence: A Review of Pattern Jury Instructions, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 587 (2002);
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Sleight of Hand, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1999 (2007).
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THE POLICY RATIONALE FOR CONTRA PROFERENTEM

Courts and commentators have offered a variety of rationales for contra
proferentem. Perhaps the dominant explanation is that the rule discourages
ambiguity: Drafters will draft clearer contracts if they know that ambiguous
language will be construed against them.15 A related explanation, especially
when the doctrine is applied in connection with standard form contracts (such as
insurance contracts), is that the doctrine serves to protect the public against
institutions that are inclined to draft obscure contracts to entrap consumers.16
Recently commentators have challenged these explanations, arguing that
contra proferentem is not likely to lead to clear contracts and that the
conventional explanations rest on incorrect understandings of both actual law
and common practice.17 They have instead emphasized that the creators of
widely used contracts value the certainty that a clause will be construed a
particular way more than they value any particular construction. This insight
leads them to conclude that drafters too prefer that provisions be construed
against them, because such a construction produces a standard meaning for each
clause that they can plan around.18

15. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 cmt. a (1981); Richard A. Posner, The
Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1581, 1608 (2005) (“The doctrine of
contra proferentum may still be a sensible tiebreaker, on the ground that the party who drafted the
contract was probably in the better position to avoid ambiguities. But this is not always the case.”);
Abraham, supra note 4, at 533; cf. Horton, supra note 3, at 433–34 (discussing conventional
explanations); Rappaport, supra note 3 (same).
16. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 cmt. a; Posner, supra note 15, at 1590
(“The second of these tie-breaking rules, contra proferentem, is conventionally defended on the
ground that the drafting party may be able to pull a fast one on the other party, a defense that fails
when the other party is commercially sophisticated.”).
17. See Boardman, Contra Proferentem, supra note 3, at 1121 (“In short, from power comes
responsibility: ‘Convoluted or confusing terms are the problem of the insurer . . . not the insured . . . .’
Nicely turned out, but not true.”) (alterations in original) (footnote omitted); Yuval Feldman &
Doron Teichman, Are Contractual Obligations Created Equal?, 100 GEO. L.J. 5, 35–36 (2011) (“Legal
scholars have presented competing rationales for this doctrine. . . . Our findings suggest a new
explanation for the doctrine that rests on purely ex post grounds. Participants in [our] experiment
viewed contractual obligations that were dictated by the opposing party as obligations with a weaker
noninstrumental value. . . . These perceptions may be reflected in the doctrine of contra proferentem
that grants the nondrafting party greater freedom in interpreting the text of the contract.”); Horton,
supra note 3, at 437 (“The traditional rationale for contra proferentem hinges on control: to deter
ambiguities, courts interpret them against the party responsible for the faulty language. Academics
have offered a second explanation: contra proferentem is a ‘penalty default rule’ that facilitates
information flow by making the drafter spell out the parties’ rights and duties or suffer dire
consequences. . . . [T]wo other potential bases for the rule—that it ameliorates the problems inherent
in standard-form contracts and redistributes wealth from firms to consumers—rest on dubious
assumptions. Here, I articulate a new justification for strict liability contra proferentem. . . . The strict
against-the-drafter doctrine deters imprecision but not necessarily to influence the problematic
relationship between consumers and the contents of the agreement. Instead, it does so to encourage
singularity of meaning in mass-produced contracts.”) (footnotes omitted).
18. Michelle Boardman has elaborated this idea in a number of articles cited supra note 3.
Horton puts it this way: “[C]ontrary to orthodox understandings of the doctrine, the rule does not
[deter ambiguity] primarily to help adherents [in contracts of adhesion]. Instead it does so because
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The long-standing text/context debate over contract interpretation, 19 in
which Williston and Corbin most famously engaged, might inform the
application of contra proferentem. This is particularly so with respect to the
question of whether the rule is one of last resort. Faced with ambiguity in a
written contract, followers of Corbin would look to context and extrinsic
evidence to determine the terms of the contract, and might turn to contra
proferentem only as a last resort. Followers of Williston, on the other hand,
might prefer to resolve all ambiguities with rules of construction, such as contra
proferentem, that will yield predictable outcomes that do not even acknowledge
information outside the writing.
We do not undertake to defend or rationalize the doctrine ourselves. But
we must observe that the details and mechanics of the rule’s application need to
be designed with the purpose of the rule in view. Our focus in what follows is on
the process by which the rule is applied, and particularly on the role of the jury in
its application. Our inquiry into the role of the jury is important for
understanding the work the doctrine does—and it is remarkable that no one has
studied whether this canon of construction or interpretation (for there is some
debate about which it is) 20 is for the judge or jury. 21 The power of the doctrine to
produce consistent, judicially controlled readings of standard contractual
language, for example, is undermined if the doctrine is applied by juries instead
of judges. Similarly, if the doctrine is for juries to apply—and judges have the
power and incentives to keep the interpretive issue away from the jury—the rule
is not likely to have a systematic effect on the law or any particular standardized
clause. Continued confusion about the mechanics of the rule’s application
impairs the rule’s ability to function.
II.

TO WHICH CONTRACTS DOES CONTRA PROFERENTEM APPLY?

In light of the various rationales proffered for contra proferentem, it isn’t
obvious that it ought to be applied as a matter of general contract law to every
transactional context. Although it is recognized broadly as a rule of insurance

imprecise standard-form contracts are deleterious both for drafters and social utility.” Horton, supra
note 3, at 473.
19. See generally Ronald J. Gilson, Charles S. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Text and Context:
Contract Interpretation as Contract Design, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 23 (2014).
20.
The Second Restatement of Contracts restates contra proferentem under the topic
“Considerations of Fairness and Public Interest,” suggesting that the rule is one of construction rather
than interpretation. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206; see also Joyner v. Adams, 361
S.E.2d 902, 905 (N.C. App. 1987) (“The rule is essentially one of legal effect, of ‘construction’ rather
than ‘interpretation,’ since ‘it can scarcely be said to be designed to ascertain the meanings attached by
the parties.’” (quoting E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, § 7.11, at 500 (1982))). Yet innumerable
cases speak about the doctrine as one of interpretation, for the jury to apply. See infra Sections III and
IV.
21. Horton’s article, supra note 3, doesn’t mention the jury. Neither do Boardman’s articles on
the doctrine, supra note 3.
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law (that applies to corporate and individual policyholders alike), 22 we tried to
assess whether the general law of contract recognizes the rule.
A.

More than an Insurance Law Rule?

There are wide ranges of cases outside the canonical area of insurance law
throughout the states that employ contra proferentem. For example, we found
courts applying the rule against an employer in an employment contract;23
against the drafter of a marriage settlement agreement;24 against the drafter of
stock certificates;25 against a bank which drafted a money market certificate
serving as the relevant agreement;26 against the drafter of a cooperative
apartment association agreement;27 against the drafting lessors of property lease

22. See, e.g., Minnesota Sch. Bds. Ass’n Ins. Trust v. Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau, 331 F.3d 579, 581–
82 (8th Cir. 2003) (similar in Minnesota law); Morgan Stanley Grp. Inc. v. New England Ins. Co., 225
F.3d 270, 279 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[T]here is no general rule in New York denying sophisticated businesses
the benefit of contra proferentem.”); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. MetPath, Inc., 38 F. Supp. 2d
1087, 1091 (D. Minn. 1998) (rejecting argument that contra proferentem “should not apply to the
Defendants because they are large, sophisticated companies”); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 607 N.E.2d 1204, 1219 (Ill. 1992) (holding that “any insured, whether large and
sophisticated or not, must enter into a contract with the insurer which is written according to the
insurer’s pleasure by the insurer. Generally, since little or no negotiation occurs in this process, the
insurer has total control of the terms and the drafting of the contract,” so contra proferentem should
apply) (citations omitted); CPS Chem. Co. v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 536 A.2d 311, 318 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1988) (“These principles are no less applicable merely because the insured is itself a corporate
giant. The critical fact remains that the ambiguity was caused by language selected by the insurer.”); 2
STEVEN PLITT ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE § 22:24 (3d ed. 2015) (“Avoidance of the rule . . . is not
required merely because an insured party is a business rather than an individual.”). For more nuance
on the way sophistication relates to the application of contra proferentem in insurance law, see infra
note 57. However, when the dispute is between two insurance companies fighting about the terms of
the policy, the rule generally does not apply. See, e.g., Maryland Cas. Co. v. Alliance Mut. Cas. Co.,
576 P.2d 625 (Kan. 1978); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 408 P.2d 596
(Kan. 1965); see also COMM. ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS ASS’N OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES,
NEW YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTION—CIVIL DIVISION § (4)(B)(3) [hereinafter N.Y. JURY
INSTRUCTIONS] (“The rule of contract interpretation that ambiguities in insurance policies should be
construed against the insurer who drafted the policy, known as the doctrine of contra proferentem,
does not apply where the party who did not draft the contract was sophisticated and had equal
bargaining power, came up with the basic concept and terms for the contract and was instrumental in
crafting various parts of the contract, and acted like an insurance company by maintaining a selfinsured retention.”).
23. Gibson v. Nye Frontier Ford, Inc., 205 P.3d 1091, 1097 (Alaska 2009); Abrams v. Horizon
Corp., 669 P.2d 51, 57 (Ariz. 1983); Int’l Billing Servs., Inc. v. Emigh, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 532, 538 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2000).
24. Hussein-Scott v. Scott, 298 P.3d 179, 183 (Alaska 2013) (holding that although Alaska law
disfavors contra proferentem in marriage settlements, this agreement was to be interpreted under
Florida law); McMullin v. McMullin, 338 S.W.3d 315, 322 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001) (applying the rule to a
marriage settlement agreement).
25. Kaiser Aluminum Corp. v. Matheson, 681 A.2d 392, 398 (Del. 1996).
26. Craig v. Hastings State Bank, 380 N.W.2d 618, 621 (Neb. 1986).
27. 1901 Wyoming Ave. Coop. Ass’n v. Lee, 345 A.2d 456, 463 (D.C. 1975); see also Highland
Lakes Country Club & Cmty. Ass’n v. Franzino, 892 A.2d 646, 660 (N.J. 2006) (Wallace, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that ambiguities should be construed against drafters of bylaws of a country club).

2015]

CONTRA PROFERENTEM

779

agreements;28 against landlords in disputes with tenants;29 against sellers of real
property in a purchase-and-sale form agreement prepared by a real estate firm
on behalf of the sellers;30 against buyers in a real estate transaction when they
were the drafting party; 31 and against the drafter of a letter from one lawyer to
another that was held to contain actionable promises.32 These examples
reinforce the view that contra proferetem is not a doctrine limited to the
insurance contract context but has wider application in the general law of
contract. At least Arizona,33 Arkansas,34 California,35 Colorado, 36 Delaware,37
Idaho,38 Iowa,39 Massachusetts,40 Michigan,41 Mississippi,42 New Jersey,43 New

28. Kutkowski v. Princeville Prince Golf Course, LLC, 300 P.3d 1009, 1019 (Haw. 2013); Owens
v. McDermott, Will & Emery, 736 N.E.2d 145, 154 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000); Berg v. Hudesman, 801 P.2d
222, 233–34 (Wash. 1990).
29. Maryland Arms Ltd. P’ship v. Connell, 786 N.W.2d 15, 25 (Wis. 2010).
30. DeWolfe v. Hingham Ctr., Ltd., 985 N.E.2d 1187, 1195–96 (Mass. 2013).
31. Highland Inns Corp. v. American Landmark Corp., 650 S.W.2d 667, 674 (Mo. Ct. App.
1983).
32. Lai Ling Cheng v. Modansky Leasing Co., 539 N.E.2d 570, 573 (N.Y. 1989).
33. CIVIL JURY I NSTRUCTIONS COMM. OF THE STATE BAR OF A RIZ., REVISED ARIZONA JURY
INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL) § 27 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter ARIZ. JURY I NSTRUCTIONS], available at
http://www.azbar.org/media/58793/contracts_2013.pdf.
34. ARK. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON JURY I NSTRUCTIONS—CIVIL, ARKANSAS MODEL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS § 2424 (2014) [hereinafter ARK. JURY I NSTRUCTIONS], available at
https://govt.westlaw.com/armji/Document/Ib7bda834053f11db9346b0b8bf67faf0?viewType=FullText&
originationContext=documenttoc&transitionType=CategoryPageItem&contextData=(sc.Default).
35. CAL. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 11, No. 320.
36. See COLO. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON CIVIL JURY I NSTRUCTIONS, COLORADO JURY
INSTRUCTIONS FOR CIVIL TRIALS § 30:35 (CLE ed. 2013) [hereinafter COLO. JURY INSTRUCTIONS],
available at http://www.cobar.org/cle/photos/tableofcontents/ZCJICT13B.pdf.
37. See PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR CIVIL PRACTICE IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE
STATE OF DELAWARE § 19.15 (2000) [hereinafter DEL. JURY INSTRUCTIONS], available at
http://courts.delaware.gov/Superior/pattern/patternjury_rev_81506.pdf (putting the instruction about
construction against the drafter first for the jury’s consideration—prior to the consideration of
extrinsic evidence).
38. See IDAHO SUPREME COURT CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM., IDAHO CIVIL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS § 6.08.3 (2009) [hereinafter IDAHO JURY INSTRUCTIONS], available at
https://www.isc.idaho.gov/main/civil-jury-instructions (last visited Sept. 15, 2015).
39. See IOWA STATE BAR ASSOC. UNIF. COURT INSTRUCTIONS, IOWA CIVIL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS § 2400.5 (2004).
40. See JOSEPH D. LIPCHITZ, AMANDA B. CAROZZA, MASS. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. INC., 2
MASSACHUSETTS SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL PRACTICE JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 14.3.3 (3d ed. 2014)
[hereinafter MASS. JURY INSTRUCTIONS].
41. See HON. WILLIAM MURPHY & JOHN VANDENHOMBERGH, MICHIGAN NON-STANDARD
JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL) § 40:4 (2014) [hereinafter MICH. JURY INSTRUCTIONS] (making clear that
only after all other evidence fails to provide a determination of intent may a jury construe a contract
against the drafter).
42. See MISS. JUDICIAL COLLEGE, MISSISSIPPI MODEL JURY I NSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL) § 10:16–17
(2014) [hereinafter MISS. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS]; MISS. JUDICIAL COLLEGE, MISSISSIPPI PLAIN
LANGUAGE MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS (Civil) § 704 (2014).
43. See MODEL CIVIL JURY CHARGE COMM., NEW JERSEY MODEL CIVIL JURY CHARGES
§ 4.10H (1998) [hereinafter N.J. JURY INSTRUCTIONS] (“The following instruction is appropriate if the
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York,44 Nevada, 45 North Dakota,46 Oregon, 47 Virginia,48 and Wisconsin49 also
have pattern jury instructions that evidence the rule’s relevance as a matter of
general contract interpretation in a wide array of jurisdictions.
B.

Is the Rule Especially Applicable to Standard Form Contracts? Do
Sophisticated Parties Get to Invoke it?

As the rule’s application expanded outward from insurance contracts,50
widespread debate ensued about just how pervasive the rule ought to be. That is,
courts reasonably asked whether there were features of insurance contracts that
made them especially susceptible to contra proferentem—or whether any
contract drafted by one party rather than another provides sufficient reason for
triggering the application of the rule. As we have just highlighted above,
however, the rule has not ultimately been limited only to contracts that mimic
the “adhesive” quality of insurance contracts. But courts do sometimes find that
the rule has especial importance in the take-it-or-leave-it context of standard
form contracting. 51 It is probably fair to say that a stronger version of the rule

contract was drafted by just one of the parties. No case has been located which approves this
instruction as modified and applied to particular paragraphs when the entire contract has been the
product of joint drafting. If you have considered all of the evidence to ascertain the intentions of the
parties and you are still unable to decide what the parties originally intended the disputed contract
language to mean, then that language as it exists should be interpreted against the party who wrote the
contract.”).
44. See N.Y. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 22, § 4:1,VI.A.2 (“In cases of doubt or ambiguity,
a contract must be construed most strongly against the party who prepared it and favorably to a party
who had no voice in the selection of its language.”). Note that in New York, “[w]here no extrinsic
evidence of the parties’ intent is offered, the construction of an ambiguous contract is a question of law
for the court.” Id.
45. See STATE BAR OF NEV., NEVADA JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CIVIL § 12CN.18 (2011)
(“Ambiguous terms are to be construed against the party that drafted them.”).
46. See STATE BAR ASS’N OF N.D., NORTH DAKOTA JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CIVIL § C-50.24
(2012) (“In cases of uncertainty, the language of a contact should be interpreted most strongly against
the party who caused the uncertainty to exist.”).
47. See OR. STATE BAR COMM. ON UNIF. CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, OREGON UNIF. CIVIL
JURY INSTRUCTIONS No. 65.17B (2006).
48. See RONALD J. BACIGAL & MARGARET IVEY BACIGAL, VIRGINIA PRAC. JURY
INSTRUCTIONS § 55:1 (2014) [hereinafter VA. JURY INSTRUCTIONS].
49. See WISCONSIN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL § 3051 (2012).
50. The rule has a much longer history in contract law, told by Economy Premier Assurance Co.
v. Western Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co., 839 N.W.2d 749 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013), and Horton, supra note 3, at
438–46. But the general story of the doctrine as a core of insurance law which then, in turn, gave courts
more comfort with more applications of the doctrine outside insurance law is a conventional story
which we accept here without independently testing.
51. See Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168, 171 (Cal. 1966) (“These principles of
interpretation of insurance contracts have found new and vivid restatement in the doctrine of the
adhesion contract.”); Anderson v. Baker, 641 P.2d 1035, 1039 (Mont. 1982) (same); Sears Roebuck &
Co. v. Avery, 593 S.E.2d 424, 433–34 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (same); Joyner v. Adams, 361 S.E.2d 902,
905–06 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (highlighting the rule’s central importance in cases of adhesion contracts);
Maryland Arms Ltd. P’ship v. Connell, 786 N.W.2d 15, 25 n.14 (Wis. 2010) (noting that the rule is
particularly applicable in standardized contracts); see also 1 PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J.

2015]

CONTRA PROFERENTEM

781

applies in the standard form contracting context; California’s jury instructions,
for example, are explicit on this point.52
Still, the standard form contract context is not limited to consumer form
contracts: corporations or big entities that are on the receiving end of form
contracts similarly find themselves getting the benefit of the rule, even if not the
strongest version of it.53 This is not, however, to say that courts are indifferent to
the bargaining power or the status of the parties. 54 Rather, the core focus of a
court’s decision about the application of contra proferentem turns on whether
there was negotiation between the parties and/or joint drafting. Although some
courts wonder aloud whether it makes sense to give sophisticated parties the
benefit of the rule at all (implicitly assuming the rule serves the interests of
nondrafters, not those of drafters), most acknowledge that the weight of
authority does not limit the rule’s application except in cases of joint negotiation
and joint drafting.55
Some courts also focus on whether parties were represented by counsel.56
But just having a sophisticated nondrafting party isn’t enough to form a general

O’CONNOR, J R., BRUNER & O’CONNOR ON CONSTRUCTION LAW § 3:28 (2014) (“[T]he contra
proferentem rule and adhesion contract analysis have historically been inextricably bound.”) (emphasis
added).
52. See CAL. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 11, No. 320 (“This rule is applied more strongly in
the case of adhesion contracts.” (citing Badie v. Bank of America, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 287–88 (Ct.
App. 1998))).
53. See, e.g., Horton, supra note 3, at 442–43 (“[C]ourts applied strict liability contra
proferentem to a variety of contracts . . . . [and] [t]hey did so without regard to the non-drafting party’s
wealth or status.”) (footnotes omitted).
54. See Joyner, 361 S.E.2d at 905–06 (considering the strength of a drafting party’s bargaining
position when applying the rule); Highland Lakes Country Club & Cmty. Ass’n v. Franzino, 892 A.2d
646, 660 (N.J. 2006) (Wallace, J., dissenting) (same ); Bd. of Educ. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 798 A.2d 605,
609–10 (N.J. 2002) (same); Seligson, Morris & Neuburger v. Fairbanks Whitney Corp., 257 N.Y.S.2d
706, 713 (App. Div. 1965) (considering it a strike against the application of the rule when “the persons
who participated in the making of the written agreement were sophisticated persons with extensive
business, and some with legal, training”); Maryland Arms, 786 N.W.2d at 25 (suggesting that a
“stronger bargaining position” by the drafting party is a reason to favor an interpretation against the
drafter); Horton, supra note 3, at 445 (“[C]ourts declined to apply [contra proferentem] to contracts
between equals.”).
55. See Central Tel. Co. of Va. v. Sprint Commc’ns Co. of Va., No. 3:09cv720, 2011 WL 6205975,
at *11 n.12 (E.D. Va. Dec. 13, 2011) (applying contra proferentem in a contract case between two large
enterprises, noting that the contract at issue was not an “arms length transaction”), aff’d, 715 F.3d 501
(4th Cir. 2013). But see Joyner, 361 S.E.2d at 906 (rejecting the application of the rule “where parties
were at arms length and were equally sophisticated”).
56. See Beanstalk Grp. v. AM Gen. Corp., 283 F.3d 856, 858 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that most
courts now agree that the principle that contracts are to be construed against the drafting party does
not apply when both parties are sophisticated parties represented by counsel); Elliott v. Pikeville Nat’l
Bank & Trust Co., 128 S.W.2d 756, 760 (Ky. Ct. App. 1939) (suggesting that the rule shouldn’t apply
because the plaintiff showed the contract to an attorney before he signed it); Bee Bldg. Co. v. Peters
Trust Co., 183 N.W. 302, 304 (Neb. 1921) (refusing to apply the rule to represented parties).
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exception to the rule.57 The crux seems to be actual negotiation, deliberation,
and dickering over terms.58
Here is an example of how the exception is articulated, which tends not to
isolate just one triggering feature: “Where both parties to a contract are
sophisticated business persons advised by counsel and the contract is a product
of negotiations at arm’s length between the parties, we find no reason to
automatically construe ambiguities in the contract against the drafter.”59 Still,
our sense of the cases is that the exception is more likely to be applied in cases of
negotiations at arm’s length60—and the other features associated with the
exception tend to be epiphenomenal.61
III. IS THIS A RULE FOR THE COURT OR FOR THE JURY?
In his article The Role of the Jury (and the Fact/Law Distinction) in the
Interpretation of Written Contracts,62 Bill Whitford argued that juries decide
more contract cases than most of us appreciate. One of the questions we wanted
to address here is the role of the jury in applying the contra proferentem doctrine.
Beyond the clearly important practical question of who applies the rule, judge or
jury, the “who decides” question may have other important implications. 63 For
example, if application of the rule is considered part of the jury’s interpretation
of the contract as a matter of fact, the application will survive appeal unless
clearly erroneous, while if it is a matter of law, the appellate court will have
broader power of review. Similarly, if the rule simply leads a jury to adopt an
interpretation as a matter of fact, its decision will not be entitled to stare

57. There is discussion about a trend toward a “sophisticated insured” exception in insurance
law, but the sophistication of the insured there too is probably less important standing alone than is
joint drafting and negotiating at arm’s length. See 2 PLITT ET AL., supra note 22, § 22:24 (noting that
the rule might not apply if a sophisticated insured “fully negotiated the insurance contract”); Hazel
Glenn Beh, Reassessing the Sophisticated Insured Exception, 39 TORT TRIAL & INS. L.J. 85 (2003);
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reassessing the “Sophisticated” Policyholder Defense in Insurance Coverage
Litigation, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 87 (1993).
58. See, e.g., Cook v. Cook, 249 P.3d 1070, 1078 (Alaska 2011) (when both parties carefully
debate the provisions, contra proferentem shouldn’t apply); BRUNER & O’CONNOR, JR., supra note 51,
§ 3:28 (noting that the “rule is used less frequently in private agreements negotiated between parties in
roughly equal bargaining positions”).
59. Western Sling & Cable Co., Inc. v. Hamilton, 545 So. 2d 29, 32 (Ala. 1989).
60. See Morgan Stanley v. New England Ins. Co., 225 F.3d 270, 280 (2d Cir. 2000) (deciding that
the linchpin was that the insured—Morgan Stanley—did not negotiate its terms and therefore it did
not matter that Morgan Stanley is obviously a sophisticated party); see also FabArc Steel Supply, Inc.
v. Composite Constr. Sys., Inc., 914 So. 2d 344, 359–60 (Ala. 2005) (focusing on the “arm’s length”
negotiations as the reason not to apply contra proferentem).
61. See Pittston Co. Ultramar Am. Ltd. v. Allianz Ins. Co., 124 F.3d 508, 521 (3d Cir. 1997)
(“[T]he dispositive question is not merely whether the insured is a sophisticated corporate entity, but
rather whether the insurance contract is negotiated, jointly drafted or drafted by the insured.”);
Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 625 A.2d 1, 16 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) (focusing on
whether the contract was jointly negotiated rather than focusing only on “sophistication”).
62. Whitford, supra note 1.
63. See infra Section IV for a discussion of the various approaches taken to the question.
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decisis.64 Moreover, David Horton’s work on class actions may suggest that if
application of the doctrine is for the jury, and especially if the jury cannot apply
the doctrine until after it has considered extrinsic evidence, class actions may not
be available to challenge ambiguous contracts.65
When a written contract is unambiguous, its interpretation is generally for
the court.66 However, “[o]nce it is determined that there is an ambiguity or
incompleteness, the question of how to resolve the ambiguity or what terms were
intended to supplement the written contract is commonly sent to the jury,
because the determination is based in part on contested extrinsic evidence.”67
Inasmuch as ambiguity is a prerequisite for the application of contra
proferentem, it might seem that the application of the doctrine is necessarily the
province of the jury. On the other hand, the rule “can scarcely be said to be
designed to ascertain the meanings attached by the parties,”68 and as a rule of
construction as opposed to one of interpretation, it might seem the epitome of a
rule of law to be applied by judges.69 Moreover, the application of the doctrine
does not turn on extrinsic evidence (unless there is some dispute about whether
the ambiguous contract term was jointly or singly authored), and thus there
might not seem to be any particular role for a factfinder in its application.
As noted above, even extended treatments of the contra proferentem
doctrine typically ignore the question of who applies the rule, or assume that it is
a matter of law for the courts. Whitford himself seems to view contra
proferentem as a “general proposition” whose application yields precedential
force so that its application should be viewed as a matter of law. 70 In practice,

64. See 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 340–42 (3d ed. 2004).
Farnsworth does acknowledge the possibility that assignment to judge or jury is not dispositive on the
question of the scope of review. Id.; cf. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 838–39
(2015) (holding that trial court’s resolution of subsidiary factual matters made while construing a
patent claim are findings of fact reviewable only for clear error, notwithstanding that construction of
the claim is for the court and not the jury).
65. See Horton, supra note 3; see also infra text accompanying note 95.
66. See Teva Pharm., 135 S. Ct. at 837 (“The construction of written instruments is one of those
things that judges often do and are likely to do better than jurors unburdened by training in exegesis.”
(quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388 (1996))).
67. Whitford, supra note 1, at 939; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 212(2)
(1981) (“A question of interpretation of an integrated agreement is to be determined by the trier of
fact if it depends on the credibility of extrinsic evidence or on a choice among reasonable inferences to
be drawn from extrinsic evidence. Otherwise a question of interpretation of an integrated agreement is
to be determined as a question of law.”). See generally 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 64, at 336–42.
68. 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 64, at 303.
69. See Connie’s Const. Co., Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 207, 210 (Iowa 1975)
(“Although we have frequently used the terms ‘interpretation’ and ‘construction’ interchangeably,
they have a distinct technical significance which in jury cases affects whether a particular contract
problem is an issue for the jury or for the court. Interpretation, the meaning of contractual words, is an
issue for the court unless it depends on extrinsic evidence or on a choice among reasonable inferences
from extrinsic evidence. Construction, the legal effect of a contract, is always a matter of law to be
decided by the court. . . . The problem in this case is construction of the exclusion in relation to the
undisputed facts. . . . The doctrine of contra proferentem applies.”) (citations omitted).
70. See Whitford, supra note 1, at 935.
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appellate courts often apply the doctrine 71 or cite it to reinforce their opinions
even when the doctrine has not been applied at trial,72 suggesting that it is a
matter of law for the courts. And of course the jury question does not arise in
equity cases. 73
Ultimately, we found the evidence mixed. At the trial court level, some
jurisdictions hold that the rule should be applied by the trial judge,74 or at least
that it is not error to fail to instruct the jury on the question. 75 Others hold that
application of the rule is for the jury.76 Many more jurisdictions—like scholars—
seem not to have addressed the question squarely. We suspect that some judges
may actually prefer some ambiguity in the doctrine governing the submission of
interpretation issues to the jury, which allows them flexibility to keep issues from
the jury for any number of reasons. However, as discussed in the previous and
next Sections, many jurisdictions’ pattern jury instructions address in detail the
way in which the jury is to apply the doctrine. These instructions suggest that
application of contra proferentem doctrine is often assigned to the jury.

71. See, e.g., Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Avatex Corp., 715 A.2d 843, 852–53 (Del. 1998); SI Mgmt.
L.P. v. Wininger, 707 A.2d 37, 43 (Del. 1998); Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Oglesby, 695 A.2d 1146, 1149–
50 (Del. 1997).
72. See, e.g., Harris v. Union Elec. Co., 787 F.2d 355, 365 n.7 (8th Cir. 1986); DeWolfe v.
Hingham Ctr., Ltd., 985 N.E.2d 1187, 1195 (Mass. 2013); Costa v. Brait Builders Corp., 972 N.E.2d 449,
458 (Mass. 2012); Maryland Arms Ltd. P’ship v. Connell, 786 N.W.2d 15, 25 (Wis. 2010).
73. See, e.g., Shiftan v. Morgan Joseph Holdings, Inc., 57 A.3d 928, 936 (Del. Ch. 2012).
74. Craig v. Hastings State Bank, 380 N.W.2d 618, 621 (Neb. 1986); Denis v. Woodmen
Accident & Life Co., 334 N.W.2d 463, 465 (Neb. 1983); see also Lopez v. Munoz, Hockema & Reed,
L.L.P., 22 S.W.3d 857, 865–66 (Tex. 2000) (Gonzales, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“Generally, when the objective meaning of a contract term is ambiguous, the parties’ subjective
meaning of the term becomes a fact question. In some circumstances, however, courts will construe the
contract to favor one party in light of the relationship of the parties or public policy. For example,
when an insurance contract is ambiguous, the contract is construed against the insurer.”) (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
75. See, e.g., Motor Coils Mfg. Co. v. Am. Ins. Co., 454 A.2d 1044, 1049 (Pa. Super. 1982).
Perhaps this case explains why we did not find a model contra proferentem jury instruction in
Pennsylvania outside the indemnity clause context. See PENNSYLVANIA SUGGESTED STANDARD CIVIL
JURY INSTRUCTIONS, § 6.270 (4th ed. 2011).
76. See, e.g., Klapp v. United Ins. Grp. Agency, Inc., 663 N.W.2d 447, 455 (Mich. 2003) (“[I]f the
language of a contract is ambiguous, and the jury remains unable to determine what the parties
intended after considering all relevant extrinsic evidence, the jury should only then find in favor of the
nondrafter of the contract pursuant to the rule of contra proferentem. In other words, the rule of
contra proferentem should be viewed essentially as a ‘tie-breaker’ . . . .”); cf. Dardovitch v. Haltzman,
190 F.3d 125, 138, n.11 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[F]actors the court considered do fall within the ambit of legal
construction of a contract, including the contra proferentem principle (that a document should be
interpreted against its drafter) . . . . But these factors can also be important in the factual interpretation
of a contract.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 cmt. a (1981) (observing that contra
proferentem “is in strictness a rule of legal effect, sometimes called construction, as well as
interpretation”).
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IV. WHAT KIND OF RULE IS IT?
Knowing whether contra proferentem is a rule for the jury or the court only
clarifies part of how it operates in action. There is also some debate about how
to characterize the rule, regardless of whether it is for the court or for the jury.
There are essentially three possibilities: it is (1) a “strict liability” rule that is
triggered early in the process of interpretation or construction; (2) a “tiebreaker”
or rule of “last resort” that is a very secondary consideration in interpretive
disputes; or (3) it is one of a list of factors to be considered in interpretive
disputes along with other evidence of party intent and other concerns of public
policy. The first and second options could be for the judge or jury, while the third
option seems like it must be for the ultimate fact-finder. How the rule is
characterized by courts or to juries obviously affects how well it will be
calibrated to its purposes, whatever those may be.77
In some cases—especially ones celebrated by Horton78—courts treat the
rule as a very strong presumption against the drafter even before the interpretive
enterprise about the parties’ intentions gets off the ground; this is certainly part
of the insurance law version of the rule in some jurisdictions.79 At the least, the
presumption against the drafter/insurer could be the first rule of thumb a
decision maker might be asked to consider.80 There are many reasons such a
strong version of the rule—what Horton calls “strict liability”—might be
deployed. If the rule, for example, is really calibrated to incentivize careful
drafting by the drafter, it might be most productive to trigger the rule early and
strongly in the interpretive process. If the rule is part of a redistributive agenda,
too, it ought to be deployed strongly and strictly—perhaps applying it even
without the finding of a real ambiguity. 81 If the rule is serving as a way for
drafters and courts to be communicating about standard form contract
meaning—leaving the consumer mostly out of it—then some strict version of the
rule might also make the most sense. For these objectives, using ambiguity as the
triggering mechanism could be misguided. Instead, contra proferentem might be
used as a “clear statement” requirement for drafters quite generally—just as
federal courts require congressional statutes to infringe on federalism norms in
especially clear terms if they are going to infringe on them at all.82 It is certainly
worth considering that some contexts—like mass-marketed insurance policies

77. See supra Section I for an overview of the policy rationales underlying contra proferentem.
78. See Horton, supra note 3, at 440–46.
79. See, e.g., J & W Foods Corp. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 723 So. 2d 550, 552 (Miss.
1998); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Garriga, 636 So. 2d 658, 662 (Miss. 1994); Williams v. Life Ins. Co.
of Ga., 367 So. 2d 922, 925 (Miss. 1979).
80. In Delaware, the jury instruction in a case of contractual ambiguity lists the contra
proferentem instruction first. See DEL. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 37, § 19.15.
81. See Keeton, supra note 12, at 972 (suggesting that ambiguity may not be a seriously enforced
threshold for applying the rule).
82. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738–39 (2006); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S.
452, 461–64 (1991); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985).
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and standard form contracts for consumers—might be more amenable to this
kind of application of the rule.83
Although an examination of pattern jury instructions and reported opinions
may not fully capture law as it exists on the ground, these sources do suggest a
reasonable consensus. To wit, in most modern contexts, courts tend to treat the
rule as “tiebreaker” or a “rule of last resort,” as it has often been characterized.84
Some call it a “secondary” rule of interpretation.85 Notwithstanding Richard
Posner’s dismissal of the rule’s being “in practice a makeweight rather than a tie
breaker,”86 courts clearly tend to admit extrinsic evidence on ambiguities first
before relying on the rule. 87 Many jury instructions confirm the point: Michigan
clearly tells the jury to consider all evidence on intent first.88 New Jersey
instructs juries absolutely and clearly that it is a rule of last resort.89 Arizona tells
juries it is a rule of “last resort” and to apply the rule “[i]f, and only if, [they]

83. As Horton highlights so well, the strong version of the rule also facilitates class action
adjudication; certification is made more difficult if the version of the rule is merely a tiebreaker for a
factfinder in the merits analysis. Horton, supra note 3, at 452–57. Common features may not
predominate if the rule applies only after the admission of all relevant extrinsic evidence. See generally
id. Of course, now that the Supreme Court has made class action arbitration waivers bulletproof, the
issue does not much arise. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); AT&T
Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
84. See Moore v. Lomas Mortg. USA, 796 F. Supp. 300, 305 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Hurd v. Ill. Bell
Tel. Co., 136 F. Supp. 125, 134 (N.D. Ill. 1955) (“At best it is a secondary rule of interpretation, a ‘last
resort’ which may be invoked after all of the ordinary interpretative guides have been exhausted.”),
aff’d, 234 F.2d 942 (7th Cir. 1956); Kaiser Aluminum Corp. v. Matheson, 681 A.2d 392, 398–99 (Del.
1996); Petersen v. Magna Corp., 773 N.W.2d 564, 570 (Mich. 2009); cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 206 Reporter’s Note cmt. a (1981) (“[O]ne may doubt that the rule is ‘the last one to be
resorted to, and never to be applied except when other rules of interpretation fail.’”).
85. See Duncan, supra note 4, at 1123–24 (citing Cline v. Rose, 645 N.E.2d 806, 809 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1994); Malcuit v. Equity Oil & Gas Funds, Inc., 610 N.E.2d 1044, 1046–47 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992);
Raphael v. Flage, No. 89CA004539, 1989 WL 109122 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 20, 1989)).
86. Beanstalk Grp., Inc. v. AM Gen. Corp., 283 F.3d 856, 859 (7th Cir. 2002).
87. See Botkin v. Security State Bank, 130 P.3d 92, 100 (Kan. 2006) (construing ambiguity
against drafter only after considering extrinsic evidence); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Esswein,
43 S.W.3d 833, 842 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (refusing to apply contra proferentem because it “should not
be applied where the intent of the parties can be ascertained from other sources”); Stephenson v.
Oneok Res. Co., 99 P.3d 717, 722 (Okla. Civ. App. 2004) (“If there is an ambiguity in a standard
industry form, the trier of fact may look to extrinsic evidence, such as industry custom and usage, to
determine the intent of the parties.”); Scott G. Johnson, Resolving Ambiguities in Insurance Policy
Language: The Contra Proferentem Doctrine and the Use of Extrinsic Evidence, BRIEF, Winter 2004,
at 33, 34. Posner, quips aside, is not really to the contrary (though he searches for a “patent” rather
than “latent” ambiguity first). See Stone Container Corp. v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins.
Co., 165 F.3d 1157 (7th Cir. 1999).
88. See MICH. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 41, § 40:4.
89. See N.J. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 43, § 4.10H (“The following instruction is
appropriate if the contract was drafted by just one of the parties. No case has been located which
approves this instruction as modified and applied to particular paragraphs when the entire contract has
been the product of joint drafting. If you have considered all of the evidence to ascertain the intentions
of the parties and you are still unable to decide what the parties originally intended the disputed
contract language to mean, then that language as it exists should be interpreted against the party who
wrote the contract.”).
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have determined and considered the facts and circumstances surrounding the
formation of the contract and still cannot determine which of the possible,
reasonable meanings was intended by the parties.”90 Arkansas clearly instructs
its juries that contra proferentum is a rule of last resort, to be applied only after
all other efforts at interpretation are unavailing.91 Colorado, 92 Idaho, 93 and
Massachusetts 94 are similar. When class actions based on mass-distributed
contracts are at the certification stage, the requirement to use extrinsic evidence
first before triggering contra proferentem as a rule of last resort can make it
difficult for courts to certify such actions.95 This may be a reason not to use this
form of the rule in such contexts. But perhaps such a loose application of the rule
functions adequately to its task when courts are not construing a massdistributed standardized form.
Some cases and states are even more serious about treating the rule as one
of truly last resort. For example, one appellate court in Colorado suggested that
contra proferentem will apply only when there is no extrinsic evidence that could
be brought to bear on parties’ meaning of an ambiguous term.96 A federal
district court in New York also suggested that “where the relevant extrinsic
evidence offered raises a question of credibility or presents a choice among
reasonable inferences the [interpretation] of the ambiguous terms of the contract
is a question of fact which precludes the application of the contra proferentem
rule.”97 The Second Circuit clarified that contra proferentem could, however,
apply if the extrinsic evidence proffered “does not yield a conclusive answer.”98
California’s jury instructions—rooted in the state’s Civil Code 99—reveal
another way to treat the rule as a real last resort: by refusing to instruct the jury
on contra proferentem unless they deadlock with the rest of the extrinsic
evidence. As the “Directions for Use” put it, “This instruction should be given
only to a deadlocked jury, so as to avoid giving them this tool to resolve the case
before they have truly exhausted the other avenues of approach.” 100 If courts
want to be absolutely sure that factfinders don’t use the rule as a makeweight

90. ARIZ. JURY I NSTRUCTIONS, supra note 33, § 27.
91. See ARK. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 34, § 2424; see also id. (“The instruction should be
used as the final instruction pertaining to contract interpretation and should reference the previous
instructions in the set pertaining to contract interpretation.”).
92. See COLO. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 36, § 30.35.
93. See IDAHO JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 38, § 6.08.3.
94. See MASS. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 40, §§ 14.3.3, 40:4.
95. This is the core of Horton’s discovery in Horton, supra note 3.
96. See Fisher v. Community Banks of Colo., Inc., 300 P.3d 565, 569 (Colo. App. 2010).
97. Morgan Stanley Grp., Inc. v. New England Ins. Co., 36 F. Supp. 2d 605, 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
98. Morgan Stanley Grp., Inc. v. New England Ins. Co., 225 F.3d 270, 280 (2d Cir. 2000)
(quoting McCostis v. Home Ins. Co of Ind., 31 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir.1994)).
99. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1654 (West 2014) (amended 1982) (“In case of uncertainty not
removed by the preceding rules, the language of a contract should be interpreted most strongly against
the party who caused the uncertainty to exist.”).
100. See CAL. JURY I NSTRUCTIONS, supra note 11, No. 320.
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and really only employ it as a last resort, this is one way to ensure it. Of course,
this method of instructing factfinders will make the rule irrelevant in the vast
majority of cases. And that affects the rule’s ability to accomplish any objective
imputed to it.
But other states and courts are not as eager to use the rule merely as a rule
of construction for when interpretation of party intent runs out. These third
applications of the rule essentially treat contra proferetem as a thumb-on-thescales, enabling factfinders in cases of ambiguous terms to weigh the principle of
public policy against the weight of whatever evidence is brought to bear about
intention. The jury instructions in Mississippi,101 Virginia,102 and New York103
read this way. If one’s view about party intention is that it tends to be
confabulation or reconstructed with a view toward a factfinder’s sense of the
equities, it would seem to be appropriate to instruct juries and factfinders in a
way that would allow them to weigh the benefits of the contra proferetem rule
against whatever intent they are able to excavate from the evidence parties
provide. This method of instructing factfinders is not only more likely to lead it
to be used discretionarily, but also makes it more likely to be used in a way that
more neatly enables the doctrine to be a general consideration of public policy to
be weighed against how confident the factfinder is about the intent of the parties.
If one could choose only one method of application (and not divide the
application between consumer form contracting and other types of contracts),
this general rule is probably usefully somewhere between “strict liability” and a
“last resort” and may be desirable as such. Even if the application of contra
proferetem is to vary among types of contracts, this method of instructing
factfinders seems attractive outside the standardized consumer contracting
context, where for the preference for certainty is likely best served by a stronger
version of the rule that requires less exhaustion of fact development.
V.

IS IT A MANDATORY OR DEFAULT RULE?

There has been insufficient attention paid to whether contra proferentem
can be contracted around (and to the corollary question of whether insurers seek
to contract around the rule as a general matter).104 Scholars surely debate

101. See MISS. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 42, §§ 10:16–17; see also ARK. JURY
INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 34, § 2424 (“This instruction should not be used where disputed extrinsic
evidence has been offered to establish the meaning of the ambiguous language.”).
102. See VA. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 48, § 55:1.
103. See N.Y. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 22, § 4:1, VI.A.2.
104. One of us litigated cases in a New York law firm on behalf of a reinsured entity; all the
reinsurer policies contained a provision purporting to forestall the application of contra proferentem
against the reinsurers in disputes about coverage. When one of us asked partners and associates
whether the firm should pursue the argument that contra proferentem is a mandatory rule that ought
to be nondisclaimable, the firm lawyers unanimously rejected the idea. This may have been because
the reinsurance market is a much more controversial area for the application of contra proferentem in
the first place—thus, if it is disclaimable anywhere, it is disclaimable there. But no one offered any
explanation or case citation and the “waiver” of contra proferentem was presumed to be enforceable
by the reinsurer. For cases highlighting the split in authority on reinsurance and contra proferentem,
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whether contra proferentem is a “penalty default rule,” wondering whether it is
an information-forcing rule that can serve to motivate the party in the best
position to accomplish more efficient drafting or more efficient risk allocation
within the transaction.105 And it is obviously a “default” in one sense: the drafter
could always draft an unambiguous provision or dicker with a counterparty, and
that would displace the application of the rule. But it is still unclear how we are
to view a drafter adding a provision that reads, for example, “Nothing in this
contract may be construed against the drafter solely because the drafter drafted
it.” 106
From one perspective, it seems strange to imagine that drafters of consumer
form contracts particularly could so easily avoid the application of a rule
calibrated to make their drafting better. If it is so simple to avoid the rule, every
drafter that has adherents who don’t read their agreements or have the power to
negotiate them would add such a provision (unless, of course, the rule serves to
benefit them, as Boardman and Horton suggest).107 Such contexts—contracts of
adhesion—seem like sound places to enforce a mandatory rule. Yet there are
many other contexts—such as many we exposed in Section II—where the rule is
not being applied against drafters of form contracts but against drafters

see Zenith Ins. Co. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 141 F.3d 300 (7th Cir. 1998) (Wisconsin law applies
contra proferentem to reinsurers); and Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 481 F.2d 948, 954
(2d Cir. 1973) (“Although ordinarily we would be disposed to interpret the language of an ambiguous
notice in favor of the insured and against the insurer, we consider that this general rule should not
apply when both insured and insurer are ‘large insurance companies long engaged in far flung
activities in that field of economic activity.’”). See also 1A PLITT ET AL., supra note 22, § 9:15 (“When
interpreting ambiguities in contracts of reinsurance, the general standards of interpretation apply.
However, the traditional canon of interpreting ambiguity in the insurance contracts against the insurer
is not always appropriate in this context.”); id. (citing cases going both ways).
In a recent paper, Logue and Baker report that they “have not been able to find a single example
of a standard form insurance policy issued in the US that contains a term seeking to eliminate or
otherwise alter the traditional contra proferentem rule . . . . There are, however, insurance policies
written in other countries, between insurers and very sophisticated commercial policyholders, that
include provisions purporting to eliminate or alter contra proferentem.” Tom Baker & Kyle D. Logue,
Mandatory Rules and Default Rules in Insurance Contracts, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE
ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE LAW 390 (Daniel Schwarcz & Peter Siegelman eds., 2015). Logue and
Baker are here alluding to what is known as the “Bermuda form.” Id.
105. See Ian Ayres, Default Rules for Incomplete Contracts, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 585, 587 (Peter Newman ed., 1998); Ian Ayers, Ya-Huh:
There Are and Should Be Penalty Defaults, 33 FLA. ST. U. L REV. 589 (2006); Ian Ayres & Robert
Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87
(1989); Boardman, Penalty Default Rules, supra note 3; Eric A. Posner, There Are No Penalty Default
Rules in Contract Law, 33 FLA. ST. U. L REV. 563 (2006).
106. Rappaport assumes the insurance law version of the rule is mandatory. See Rappaport,
supra note 3, at 186 n.35. Boardman comes up with this formulation: “contra proferentem is best
thought of as a mandatory doctrine that creates a subclass of default substantive rules.” Boardman,
Penalty Default Rules, supra note 3, at 321. We’re not wholly sure what this means but it highlights
some of the confusion on this issue—and shows how a general answer may not be derivable from the
insurance law etiology of the modern incarnations of the rule.
107. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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generally. In such cases, it is less clear that the rule should be treated as a
mandatory one.
In the one case discussing this issue we found, McMullin v. McMullin,108 the
Kentucky Court of Appeals in 2011 refused to forestall application of contra
proferentem merely because a drafter of a property settlement agreement in a
divorce included the following provision: “no provision [of this agreement] shall
be interpreted against any party because that party or their legal representative
drafted the provisions thereof.”109 The court was particularly concerned about
parties using such provisions after intentionally introducing an ambiguity in the
agreement. Yet the court essentially suggested that it would enforce the
provision between ex-spouses as long as the provision was read to cover only
“unintentional ambiguities.”110
The American Law Institute, in considering the insurance law version of the
doctrine, comes out in support of the mandatory version of the rule in its
Principles of the Law of Liability Insurance:
A mandatory rule. Like the rules of contract interpretation
generally, [contra proferentem is a] mandatory rule[] that the parties
cannot alter by contract. Some judicial opinions appear to enforce
contract terms purporting to reject the application of the
ordinary contra proferentem rule, but close analysis of some of those
opinions reveals that the contracts in question were jointly drafted by
both parties, such that the contra proferentem rule would not have
applied in any event, regardless of the presence or absence of a
contract term purporting to reject the contra proferentem rule. If a term
is jointly drafted, there can be no single drafter against whom to
interpret any lingering ambiguity. Some cases do suggest
that contra proferentem can be waived even if the term in question is
supplied by one of the parties, provided that the parties to the contract
are commercially sophisticated and represented by legal counsel. This
Section rejects that idea to preserve the integrity of the courts over the
interpretation of insurance contracts. At most, such a term in an
insurance policy would be evidence regarding the negotiation and
drafting of the insurance policy; it would not be binding on a court. The
authority of the court over the rules of insurance policy interpretation
promotes the authority of the court over the interpretation of
insurance policy terms and, thus, the development of uniform,
reasoned meanings of insurance policy terms.111

108. 338 S.W.3d 315 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011).
109. McMullin, 338 S.W.3d at 322 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
110. Id.
111. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 4 cmt. l
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 2013) The example the ALI is likely alluding to is I.U. N. Am., Inc. v. A.I.U.
Ins. Co., 896 A.2d 880, 884–85 (Del. Super. Ct. 2006) (enforcing a jointly drafted “waiver” of contra
proferentem). For more on the question within insurance law, see Logue & Baker, supra note 104.
Logue and Baker are the reporters of the Principles of the Law of Liability Insurance. Tom Baker told
us that this project may be converted to a Restatement. Stay tuned.
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It would not be surprising to see the insurance law version of the rule track
what we would expect to be a sensible approach in consumer form contracting.
In other contexts, however, we would expect courts to be more likely to allow
the rule to serve merely as a default, as the McMullin case indicates in the cases
of unintentional rather than strategic ambiguity. Moreover, as long as parties
understand the provision “waiving” the contra proferentem rule, it is hard to see
why such a clause should not be enforceable between negotiating parties—even
if other ambiguous provisions were drafted unilaterally by one party. We expect
to see more cases as more parties seek to opt out of contra proferentem. There
may be a reason insurers aren’t trying it en masse as of yet—Logue and Baker
hypothesize that fear of regulators may be a big factor 112—but other drafters
with less regulatory oversight may be trying harder to opt out in the coming
years. We would expect consumer form contract drafters to be unsuccessful in
their efforts but other parties to have more success.
CONCLUSION
Revisiting Bill Whitford’s work on the role of the jury in contract
interpretation and his work on consumer form contracting inspired us to take a
careful look at a doctrine of contract interpretation that is usually thought to
help consumers in interpretive battles with those who draft their contracts
unilaterally. But we found that contra proferentem is more confusing than we
expected. What we have done here is lay out some of the complexities of the
doctrine, focusing on its broader application outside insurance law, its exceptions
and limitations within transactional contexts where bargaining and joint drafting
take place, the difficulty of knowing whether it is a rule for the judge or the jury
to apply, the various forms the rule can take, and the difficulty of knowing
whether it is a default or mandatory rule. We hope laying out these complexities
here helps courts and commentators in the future achieve more consistency and
nuance in their applications and discussions of this hoary principle of contract
interpretation.

112.

See Logue & Baker, supra note 104, at 14, 25.
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